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Abstract. Digital services have a significant impact on the lives of many
people and organisations. Trust influences decisions regarding potential
service providers, and continues to do so once a service provider has
been selected. There is no globally accepted model to describe trust in the
context of digital services, nor to evaluate the trustworthiness of entities.
We present a formal framework to partially fill this gap. It is based on
four building blocks: a data model, rulebooks, trustworthiness evaluation
functions and instance data. An implementation of this framework can be
used by a potential trustor to evaluate the trustworthiness of a potential
trustee.
Keywords: Trust · Trustworthiness · Semantics · Ontology · OWL ·
SPARQL .
1 Introduction
Trust is important because its presence or absence can have a strong influence
on what we choose to do or not do, both as individual and as a group. Trusting
decisions are made by all of us, often in the context of electronic service delivery.
Also automata are increasingly confronted with such decisions. The one that is
trusting is commonly referred to as the trustor, the one that is trusted is referred
to as the trustee. The trustee may live up to the trustor’s expectation, or may
let him down. Betrayal of trust is the responsibility of the trustee, not of the
trustor. The negative consequences of betrayal of trust may however impact the
trustor.
There is a lack of clarity and of agreement on the basic meaning of the terms
trust and trustworthiness. Gambetta [4] provides a broad treatment of trust,
where in the last chapter the following reasons to trust trust are given.
– If we do not, we shall never find out.
– Trust is not depleted through use, on the contrary.
High level definitions of trust exist but are hard to apply in practical situa-
tions. Castelfranchi and Francone [2] state that ‘trust is in fact a deficiency of
control that expresses itself as a desire to progress despite the inability to control’.
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The term trust carries an ambiguous meaning, as it is used both as a positive
and as a negative characteristic. In natural language, trust is perceived as a
positive term, such as trust between husband and wife. However, Gollman [5]
argues that trust is bad for security. It is remarkable that the European eIDAS
Regulation [3], covering trust services and the provision thereof, does not include
a definition of trust or trustworthiness.
In the execution of electronic transactions, there are often controls in place,
based on service providers such as Trusted Third Parties (TTPs) who claim
they can be trusted. However, the use of TTPs based on a Public Key Infras-
tructure (PKI) lacks a clear definition of trust. In this case trust is expressed
through PKI policies which consist of sets of documents, including Certificate
Policies and Practise Statements. Semantics is expressed in natural language and
formalisms such as Object Identifiers and XML Schema Definitions, which are
poor in expressing meaning. Huang and Nicol [6] state that the major PKI spec-
ification documents do not precisely define what trust means in PKIs. Rather
there are implicit trust assumptions embedded, some of which may not always be
true. Such implicit trust assumptions may cause relying parties to have differing
understandings about the meaning of certificates and trust.
We address the aforementioned problem by defining a framework that in-
cludes a structured process to define requirements, a data model and trustwor-
thiness evaluation functions that are based on these requirements and transfor-
mations that adapt real world data to the data model, allowing the transformed
data to be stored in a graph database. The practical feasibility of the framework
has been demonstrated by a partial implementation of the data model in the
Ontology Web Language (OWL), of the evaluation functions in SPARQL, and
of the transformations in XSLT. The resulting data was stored in a GraphDB
database. The framework allows the use of the semantic interpretations specified
by the data model in the evaluations and their outcomes.
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the
T E framework and its components. Section 3 describes a partial implementation
of the framework, including the creation of instance data based on real-world
information and the performance of trustworthiness evaluations on this data.
Section 4 presents related work. Section 5 gives conclusions and ideas for future
work. The appendix contains selected results from the execution of a sample
evaluation as specified in Section 3.
2 The T E framework
The objective of the T E framework is to allow a potential trustor to evaluate
the trustworthiness of a potential trustee. This evaluation is based on verifying
whether a set of rules is satisfied by particular instance data. The framework
contains four classes of components: a data model, rulebooks, trustworthiness
evaluation functions, and instance data about the potential trustees and their
context.
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2.1 Defining trustworthiness
The following working definition of trustworthiness is used in the remainder
of the article. Trustworthiness is a characteristic of an entity, where entities
include persons, ICT systems, organisations and information artefacts, with the
properties given below. An entity can be qualified as being ex-ante or ex-post
trustworthy, as follows.
– When an entity is qualified as ex-ante trustworthy a trustor can have rea-
sonable expectations that future interactions and their outcomes will be
consistent with what has been communicated or committed by the trustee.
This is also called forward-looking trustworthiness.
– When an entity is qualified as ex-post trustworthy a trustor can have reason-
able expectations that the outcome of a transaction performed in the past
can be relied upon. This is also called backward-looking trustworthiness.
2.2 Requirements
The requirements for the framework were developed on the basis of a literature
review and the requirements developed in the Horizon2020 FutureTrust project1
work packages [11], [12]. Requirements from both sources were combined into
the following set of integrated requirements.
– IR1 Semantic definition of trustworthiness: As a participant in an electronic
ecosystem I can understand the meaning of trustworthiness of participants I
plan to engage with, so that I can make an informed decision on whom to
interact with.
– IR2 Transparency: As a participant in an electronic ecosystem where I have
access to a function that allows me to evaluate trustworthiness of other par-
ticipants, I can access all information (including inputs used and operations
performed) of this function in a transparent2 way, so that I can understand
the factors that contribute to trustworthiness and their mapping on evidence
such as qualifications of entities.
– IR3 Linked and unique identity: As a participant in an electronic ecosystem
where I have access to a function that allows me to evaluate the trustworthi-
ness of other participants, I can rely on this function combining all informa-
tion about participants available within the ecosystem, so that I can claim the
outcome of the trustworthiness evaluation is based on all information known
about the evaluated participant.
– IR4 Competently acting in role As a participant in an electronic ecosystem
I have access to and I can demonstrate that I accept the definitions of roles,
the qualifications that are required per role, and how these qualifications are
demonstrated by participants, so that I can verify these arguments are suit-
able to support the reliance I want to take on the outcome of the reasoning.
1 http://www.futuretrust.eu
2 The term ‘transparent’ is used as defined in the Oxford English Dictionary figurative
meaning, as ‘frank, open, candid, ingenuous’ and ‘Easily seen through, recognized,
understood, or detected; manifest, evident, obvious, clear.’
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– IR5 Governance, security and controls: As a participant in an electronic
ecosystem I can understand the governance, security safeguards and controls
that are in place within the ecosystem, so that I can claim the outcome of the
trustworthiness evaluation took into consideration that the ecosystem meets
good practices regarding these topics.
– IR6 Policy choices: As a possible participant in an electronic interaction I can
determine the information and the reasoning justifying that a participant is
qualified as trustworthy, so that I can verify that information and reasoning
are compatible with the way I want to rely on the reasoning’s outcome.
– IR7 Obtaining credible data: As a participant in an electronic ecosystem I
can understand the origin and the type of data that is used in the evaluation
of trustworthiness of participants, so that I can claim the outcome of the
trustworthiness evaluation is based on credible data.
2.3 Framework participants
The framework positions participants within an ecosystem, structured in three
planes as depicted in Figure 1. They may invoke services provided by partici-
pants from any plane. The enabler plane consists of the participants whose role
is to enable trustworthiness, and it also contains the rulebooks and the trust-
worthiness evaluation functions which are available to all participants. The roles


















• Evidence Service Providers
• Claim Status Service Providers
Trustworthiness Monitors
Fig. 1. Planes in a trustworthy ecosystem
– Authentic Source (AS) role. An authentic source holds a mandate to register
and validate information about entities and makes this information available.
The mandate can be a document that has legal validity because it is pub-
lished in an official journal or because it is accepted to be binding through
a contract or membership agreement.
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– Endorser (EnDo) role. An endorser expresses its publicly visible approval for
a rulebook through its endorsement, and makes information on responsibil-
ity, accountability, and authority to implement security governance available
either itself or endorses information made available by others.
– Enforcer (EnFo) role. An enforcer is an entity with power to enforce conse-
quences among participants. An enforcer acts as arbiter or judge and pro-
vides the possibility for redress. Enforcement is outside the proposed sys-
tem3, but information about whether enforcement is available can be cap-
tured and reasoned about.
– Accreditation Body (AB). An accreditation body4 is an entity that performs
accreditation, i.e. the independent evaluation of conformity assessment bod-
ies against recognised criteria for their impartiality and competence. An AB
accredits participants in the role of a Conformity Assessment Body.
– Conformity Assessment Body (CAB) role. A CAB assesses the conformity
of participants and their services against relevant criteria, and provides as-
surances of conformity in the form of attestations.
The trustworthiness provision plane involves participants that provide trust-
worthiness services. The principal roles in this plane are as follows.
– Evidence Service Provider (EvSP) role. An EvSP creates information that
serves as evidence. It includes traditional Trust Service Providers such as
Certification Authorities, Identity Providers, Attribute Providers, (Remote)
Signature Services, Time Stamp Services, etc.
– Claim Status Service Provider (CsSP) role. A CsSP provides status informa-
tion regarding claims, e.g. verifying a response to an authentication request,
or verifying an electronic commitment or signature.
– Trustworthiness Monitor (TwsMo) role. A participant in this role monitors
the provision of services by EvSPs and CsSPs and attests to this.
The functional plane consists of participants that act in the role Functional
Service Providers (FuSPs), that offer business services, and Functional Service
Consumers (FuSCs), that interact with FuSP services.
2.4 Data model
Predicates are used to model the data points that are used for trustworthiness
evaluation. The purpose of the predicates is to represent things from the real
3 One may evaluate the trustworthiness of a credit card provider in a variety of ways,
for example that once all other possibilities are exhausted, potential disagreements
will be settled before a court of law (an enforcer). Courts of law and all things legal
are outside the credit card scheme. Nevertheless I can reason about whether the
presence of such an enforcer improves the outcome of evaluation of trustworthiness.
Marsh [13] Section 8.5 provides a detailed discussion of the role of an enforcer.
4 Regarding the roles of Accreditation Body and Conformity Assessment Body, the
terminology of ISO/IEC 17000:2020 [7] is adhered to.
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world, so that they can be reasoned with. To refer to terms within a predicate,
a projection function is used. It can be distinguished from the corresponding
predicate by the use of a calligraphic letter in the first position. For example
Predicatename(term1, term2) is a predicate, and Predicatename(term1, term2)
is a projection function. 15 predicates were specified, of which a selection is listed
below. S always refers to the Subject.
– Actor(X ), an entity without any attestation
– Attestation(aid, T ), where aid = the identity of the issuer of the attestation
and triple T ={S, A, V } where A refers to Attribute and V to Value
– Participant(X )
– Base role specified as Attestation(aid, (S, roleTypeBase, V ) where V refers
to an instance of a role type
– Accreditation(aid, (S, accreditedFor, N ) where N refers to Norm
– Conformance(aid, (S, doesConformTo, N ) where N refers to Norm
– LegalQualification(aid, (S, legalQual, L) where L refers to a a legal qualifi-
cation such as a law, regulation, act, or decree
2.5 Rulebooks
The purpose of a rulebook is to formally capture an understanding of what trust-
worthiness means in a particular context, where this understanding is captured
in the form of constraints. A rulebook contains a mandatory and a discretionary
part. The mandatory constraints verify the basis for relevant execution of the
discretionary rules. The latter can be selected by a potential trustor to configure
a policy for trustworthiness evaluation.
Two rulebooks were created inspired by the eIDAS Regulation [3] and ac-
cording to the specification described in Section 2.2. Rulebook βAE allows the
evaluation of the trustworthiness of an ecosystem, and βAP of a participant.
Both rulebooks were constructed as follows. IR1 is addressed by formulating
the rules that are derived from the requirements in First Order Logic (FOL)
using a taxonomy of data points that have a truth-functional interpretation.
While FOL adds value by its truth-functional interpretation, the implementation
refines this by using the Organization (ORG) ontology [20] and the Provenance
(PROV-O) ontology [19]. This improves interpretation because the ontologies
are written in OWL, which allows expression of fine-grained constraints and
provides an interpretation in natural language.
Dedicated rules were elaborated, addressing the requirements IR2, IR3, IR4
and IR5 as follows. IR2 is addressed by making the data model, the rules and the
trustworthiness evaluation functions publicly available, by using instance data
from publicly available sources, and by the specification of IR2 rules. Mandatory
rules specify requirements on existence and identification of the rulebook and
naming of participants. Discretionary rules specify requirements on the existence
of participants in specific roles.
IR3 is addressed by a mandatory rule regarding the uniqueness of identity.
Discretionary rules speficy requirements on identity attestation regarding self-
attestation, increasingly stringent third-party attestation and legal attestation
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of identity. IR4 is addressed by a mandatory rule on role attestation regarding
self-attestation, and discretionary rules specify increasingly stringent attestation
requirements for the different roles, including the legal attestation of roles. IR5
is addressed by discretionary rules that cover disclosure and segregation of duty.
IR6 is addressed by keeping the number of mandatory rules minimal, and
allowing the potential trustor to select discretionary rules that correspond best
to its policy. IR7 is addressed by selection criteria for data sources from where
the instance data will be generated.
A selection of rules is shown in Table 1. Spt corresponds the set of participants
and Sabr corresponds to the set of role attestations. Projection functions are used,
e.g. Attestationtsub(A) refers to the subject of attestation A.
Table 1. Sample rules from rulebook βAP
βIR4-M01 A participant’s base roles must be self-
attested
∀ X ∈ Spt ∃ A1, A2 ∈ Sabr
(Attestationtsub(A1) = fid(X )
∧ Attestationtatt(A1) = roleTypeBase
∧ Attestationtsub(A2) = Attestationaid(A1)
∧ Attestationtatt(A2) = roleTypeBase
∧ Attestationtval(A2) = Attestationtval(A1))
βIR4-D027A-AP If the selected participant acts in the role
of an evidence service provider
then this role must be attested to as con-
forming to the requirements of an eIDAS
TSP by inclusion in a European Trusted
List by a trustworthiness monitor
∃ A1, A2, A3 ∈ Sattn
(Attestationtsub (A1) = fid(P1)
∧ Attestationtatt(A1) = roleTypeBase
∧ Attestationtval (A1) = REvSP
∧ Attestationtsub(A2) = Attestationtsub(A1)
∧ Attestationtatt(A2) = isRegisteredIn
∧ Attestationtval(A2) = eIDASTrustList
∧ Attestationtsub(A3) = Attestationaid(A2)
∧ Attestationtatt(A3) = roleTypeBase
∧ Attestationtval (A3) = RTwsMo)
βIR4-D304-AP If the selected participant is an evidence
service provider or claim status provider,
it must be monitored by a trustworthiness
monitor attested by a legal act
∃ P1, PTwsMo ∈ SPT ∃ A1, A2, A3, A4 ∈ Sattn
(Attestationtsub (A1) = fid(P1)
∧ Attestationtatt(A1) = roleTypeBase
∧ Attestationtval (A1) = (REvSP ∨ RCsSP )
∧ Attestationtsub (A2) = fid(PTwsMo)
∧ Attestationtatt(A2) = roleTypeBase
∧ Attestationtval (A2) = RTwsMo
∧ Attestationaid(A3) = fid(PTwsMo)
∧ Attestationtsub (A3) = fid(PTwsMo)
∧ Attestationtatt(A3) = doesSupervise
∧ Attestationtval (A3) = fid(P1)
∧ Attestationtsub (A4) = fid(PTwsMo)
∧ Attestationtatt(A4) = legalQual
∧ Attestationtval (A4) = uri)
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2.6 Trustworthiness evaluation
The trustworthiness evaluation function twsevalAE is invoked by a trustor to
assist in deciding to what extent an ecosystem represented by instance data can
be regarded as trustworthy.
twsevalAE(Rid, {DiscretionaryRules}, InstanceData)
where
– Rid identifies the applicable rulebook,
– {DiscretionaryRules} denotes the set of discretionary rules selected by the
trustor, and
– InstanceData identifies the instance data that is to be used.
Execution of the function includes verification of the mandatory rules of the
selected rulebook. The function returns true when all of the evaluated rules
return true. True means that the evaluated ecosystem meets the constraints
specified in the rules, which is an indication of trustworthiness. The function
returns false when at least one of the evaluated rules returns false. False means
that the evaluated ecosystem does not meet the constraints specified in the rules,
which is an indication of a lack of trustworthiness.
The trustworthiness evaluation function twsevalAP is used to verify that a
participant is trustworthy.
twsevalAP(RBKid, P1, target base role X, {DiscretionaryRules}, InstanceData, {Norms})
where
– RBKid denotes the identification of the applicable rulebook,
– X denotes the identification of the potential trustee,
– target base role X denotes the target base role of X, i.e. the role the trustor
would expect the trustee X to act in,
– {DiscretionaryRules} stand for the set of discretionary rules selected by the
trustor, which allows to configure a trustworthiness evaluation policy, and
– InstanceData denotes the reference to the instance data that is to be used,
– {Norms} denotes the set of discretionary norms (i.e. legal acts and techni-
cal standards) the trustee is expected to provide attestations of conformity
assessment to.
The function returns true or false for each of the evaluated rules.
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2.7 Instance data
For the trustworthiness evaluation to be based on credible data, such data must
come from authoritative sources that allow access to data that corresponds to
one or more predicates. This leads to the following selection criteria. The data
source must offer data that is specified in the data model, it must be authoritative
for this data, it must include a description of its meaning, and the data must be
available in a machine readable format.
There are a number of data sources capable of providing data correspond-
ing to one or more predicates. The current implementation limits itself to data
sources in the public domain. On the basis of the selection criteria, the Euro-
pean Trusted Lists5 and the Linked Open Data source FactForge6 were selected
as data sources for information about companies. On the same basis, a FOAF
file from Elsevier’s Mendeley Data Search (described by Petrovic and Fujita [16])
and one of the first author’s X.509 certificates, produced by the Belgian national
identity register, were used as data sources about natural persons.
3 Implementation
The framework was implemented in a front-end and a back-end layer. The front
end layer contains the T E data model, created using Protégé [14], and transfor-
mation programs7 that download information from the data sources and trans-
form it according to the T E data model, and SPARQL queries whose answers
allow to verify the satisfaction of the rules. The back end layer stores the down-
loaded information as instance data in an Ontotext GraphDB database8.
The implementation was limited to the evaluation of ex-ante trustworthiness.
An evaluation of an entity as a potential trustee involves the following steps.
The trustor must connect to the database that holds the instance data, select
the discretionary rules of its choice and execute the queries that correspond to
the mandatory and selected rules. The query results allow to verify satisfaction
of the rules.
Part of an evaluation of an evidence service provider is provided as exam-
ple. The rules from Table 1 were used, specifying discretionary rules on role
attestation. Table 3 shows the results of a query that selects evidence service
providers and the provenance of their role attestation. The selection shows a.o.
two role attestations for Zetes. The first is based on the Belgian Trusted List and
demonstrates satisfaction of IR4-D027A-AP. The second is self-attested and de-
rived from the Zetes website. This demonstrates satisfaction of IR4-M01. Table
4 shows the results of a query that selects participants and their legal attesta-
tion. The legal norm can be seen in the right-most column. The selection shows
5 https://ec.europa.eu/tools/lotl/eu-lotl.xml
6 http://factforge.net
7 Developed in a combination of Java and Extensible Stylesheet Language Transfor-
mations [21] (XSLTs).
8 https://graphdb.ontotext.com/
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that the legal attestation of Zetes is based on its Certificate Practise Statement,
which demonstrates satisfaction of IR4-D304-AP.
The implementation is available online at the following URLs.
– The data model: http://www.marcsel.eu/onto/te/te-data-model.owl.
– A set of instance data: http://www.marcsel.eu/onto/te/DBL.owl.
– The rulebook βAE: http://www.marcsel.eu/onto/te/RuleBook-BAE-FOL.pdf.
– The rulebook βAP: http://www.marcsel.eu/onto/te/RuleBook-BAP-FOL.pdf.
– Trustworthiness evaluation queries that verify satisfaction of the βAP rule-
book: http://www.marcsel.eu/onto/te/RuleBook-BAP-SPARQL.txt.
4 Related work
The T E framework was compared with related work. Its model and reasoning
approach are most closely related to Bernabé’s SOFIC/Trust-DSS approach [1].
The main similarities are the following.
– Both use the formalisms of an ontology and rules with the aim to support
trust-related decisions.
– Both import other ontologies to improve interoperability.
The main differences are the following.
– SOFIC/Trust-DSS approach focuses on decisions related to cloud service
providers while the T E model addresses the broader setting of a potential
trustor and a potential trustee.
– The SOFIC/Trust-DSS approach bases its trust-related decision support on
an ontology which is security based. The T E model integrates security data
points but does not limit itself to those.
– The SOFIC/Trust-DSS approach involves significant manual effort for the
manual translation of observations about a service providers into instances
of a SOFIC class, and for the manual customisation of rules in function of
what needs to be assessed. The T E model has automated this translation
by the use of XSL, and includes the concept of a rulebook which consists of
pre-specified rules.
– The SOFIC/Trust-DSS approach is open to a variety of data sources and
rules may be created for specific cases. The T E model demonstrated its
working on actual data imported through the data import and transforma-
tion mechanism where the data is formalised in description logic.
– The SOFIC/Trust-DSS approach uses data aggregation and quantification.
The T E model does not, because it is hard if not impossible to define se-
mantics for numbers (what one person rates as 0.7 might be rated otherwise
by another person).
A high-level comparison with other related work is given in Table 2.
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Table 2. Trust-related ontologies in OWL
Model Main objectives Representation formalism Reasoning
Bernabé [1] Decision Support System for
intercloud trust and secu-
rity, to allow secure interop-
erability in a trusted hetero-
geneous multidomain
Security Ontology For the Inter-
Cloud (SOFIC) in OWL
SWRL rules over the ontol-
ogy and quantification with
Fuzzy logic
Karthik [8] Trust framework for sensor-
driven pervasive environ-
ments
OWL ontology Security rules in SWRL
Karuna [9] Trust model for on-line
health information systems
Taxonomy of trust factors and
a User’s Trust Profile Ontology
UTPO in OWL which defines trust
factors as classes, taking particu-
larly their relation to the user into
account
Recommender algorithms
Kravari [10] Internet of Things trust
management (short paper
with only schematic descrip-
tion and implementation)
ORDAIN, general-purpose ontol-




Oltramari [15] Information and decision fu-
sion as a decision support
system on trust for humans
ComTrustO, a composite trust-
based ontology framework fusion,




Sel [17] Trust modelling based on
logic
OWL DL and existing vocabularies
from W3C
Inference and SPARQL
Sullivan [18] Definition of security re-
quirements, metrics and
trust terms
Ontology for trust-terms defined in
OWL, including transparency, mea-
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5 Conclusions and Future Work
The proposed framework demonstrates a possible way to automate the evalua-
tion of trustworthiness. It consists of a data model, rulebooks, a data import and
transformation mechanism to create instance data, and queries that verify the
satisfaction of selected rules by this data. A potential trustor can select those
rules that correspond best to its policy for trustworthiness evaluation. The rules
specify requirements regarding the values of a set of data points. Queries allow
to verify the satisfaction of these rules. Under the T E framework, the interpre-
tation of a trust claim is specified as the outcome of the verification of a rule. As
a consequence, the meaning of trustworthiness and the interpretations of trust
claims are well defined. Furthermore was demonstrated how information from a
wide range of data sources can be selected and transformed in the format of the
T E data model, leading to a new way to use existing information to logically
reason about trustworthiness.
When compared to the use of trust in TTPs, we argue the proposed T E model
is more precise in terms of semantics regarding the meaning of trustworthiness
because it allows a potential trustor to select data points that represent specific
information on a potential trustee from a qualified and distributed set of data
sources.
The following are candidate topics for future research.
– The potential use of privacy-enhancing techniques to avoid the need for a
single linked identity could be investigated.
– The use of legal ontologies could be studied to analyse how additional data
points that address legal information could allow expression of legal effects
such as presumption of validity and exemption from the burden of proof as
components of the evaluation of trustworthiness.
– The possible use of trustworthy hardware and/or software for the creation
of attestations could be investigated.
– How independence (or the lack thereof) of participants contributes to trust-
worthiness could be studied.
– How to create rulebooks for a consensus-governed society rather than for a
law-governed society could be investigated. This could include the role of
membership organisations such as e.g. the Kantara Initiative9 as accredi-
tation body and as publisher of a trust list. In such a consensus-governed
society the participants must be attested by other participants using a con-
sensus scheme. Many consensus-based schemes that are based on blockchain
technology are emerging.
– Regarding the implementation, the use of additional data sources as well as
the use of on-line querying rather than the current downloading could be
analysed.
Finally, the development of a browser/mail client plug-in that embeds all or
parts of the framework is envisaged. This would allow easier experimentation
and also access for less technical users.
9 https://kantarainitiative.org/
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6 Appendix
Table 3. A selection of evidence service providers and the provenance of their role
attestation
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Table 4. A selection of participants legally attested in their role
P1 Role Attestation of
P1
LegalRole Qualifi-
cation
LegalNorm
1 te:BE-BELAC te:RoleAttestation-AB-
BE-BELAC
te:BE-
LegalQualification-
001
te:BE-Royal-Decree-BELAC-
D2014-02-07
2 te:Certipost-NV-SA te:RoleAttestation-
Certipost-NV-SA
te:BE-
LegalQualification-
003
te:BE-Certipost-CitizenCA-
CPS-Version-1.4
3 te:FR-COFRAC te:RoleAttestation-AB-
FR-COFRAC
te:FR-
LegalQualification-
001
https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/
loda/id/
JORFTEXT000019992087/
4 te:FPS-Economy-SMEs-
Self-employed-and-
Energy-Quality-and-
Safety
te:RoleAttestation-
TwsMo-FPS-Economy-
SMEs-Self-employed-
and-Energy-Quality-
and-Safety
te:BE-
LegalQualification-
004
te:BE-LAW-FPS-ECO-BE-
SIGN-establishment-2016
5 te:UK-UKAS te:RoleAttestation-AB-
UK-UKAS
te:UK-
LegalQualification-
001
https://www.legislation.gov.uk/
uksi/2009/3155/pdfs/
uksi 20093155 en.pdf
6 te:Zetes-SA-NV te:RoleAttestation-
Zetes-SA-NV
te:BE-
LegalQualification-
007
te:BE-Zetes-CitizenCA-
ForeignerCA-CP-CPS-Version-
1.1
